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COMMENT
THE ZAPATA TWO-STEP-WILL
CORPORATIONS MARCH OUT OF
DELAWARE?: ZAPATA CORP. v.
MALDONADO
The business decisions of corporate officials have long been
protected from judicial review by the business judgment rule.1
Under this doctrine, courts typically abstain from questioning bus-
iness decisions absent a showing of bad faith or fraud.2 Decisions
by directoral special litigation committees to terminate share-
holder derivative suits are within the ambit of the business judg-
ment rule.' Since litigation committees are subject to influence by
I The business judgment rule can be traced back in American jurisprudence to Percy v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829); see Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Re-
visited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 & n.1 (1979); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Deriva-
tive Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 600 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cor-
nell Note]. The rule provides that a decision made by the managing body of a corporation
may not serve as the basis of a judicial cause of action unless the challenger can demon-
strate directoral fraud or bad faith. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 145-47
(1891); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 456-57 (1881); Wheeler v. Aiken County
Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 785 (C.C.D.S. Ca. 1896); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68,
77-78 (La. 1829); 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
1039 (1975); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (2d ed. 1970). The business judgment
rule presumes that corporate directors and officers may make mistakes, but so long as they
are made in good faith, liability should not attach. Otherwise, few persons would be willing
to serve as corporate managers. Stegemoeller, Derivative Actions and the Business Judg-
ment Rule: Directorial Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J. 338, 339 (1981).
2 See United Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917);
Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16
Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659 (Ch. 1928); Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Litigation Committee: The End of a Clear Trend in Corporate Law, 14 IND. L. REV. 617,
617 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Business Judgment Rule]; note 1 supra.
I Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,
603 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn,
485 F. Supp. 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24, 393
N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979). Many jurisdictions allow corporate boards of
directors chartered under their laws to devolve power to directoral committees. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (Deering 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1963); Com-
ment, Corporate Management by an Executive Committee: Proposed New York Business
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defendant-directors, 4 however, the ability of shareholders to chal-
lenge corporate mismanagement may be diminished.5 Recently, in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,' the Supreme Court of Delaware, con-
fronted with this dilemma, held that even absent a showing of bad
faith on the part of a corporate litigation committee, the trial court
may, in its discretion, substitute its own business judgment for
that of the litigation committee. 7
Zapata involved a stockholder derivative action alleging
breaches of fiduciary duties by the entire board of directors of the
Zapata Corporation.' After this action was instituted, four direc-
tors left Zapata Corporation's board, and two new directors were
Corporation Act, 25 ALB. L. REV. 93, 93 (1961). The section of the Delaware corporate law
which permits such delegation is especially broad, and provides that as long as the certifi-
cate of incorporation so permits, a committee may be given complete authority over any
item confronting the full board. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1975). Special litigation
committees created pursuant to such statutory authority are groups of disinterested direc-
tors authorized to determine whether pending derivative litigation is in the best interests of
the corporation. See Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 608.
4 See Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 619-26; notes 36-44 and accompanying text infra.
See Note, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 635. Shareholder derivative
actions have been heralded as "the most important procedure the law has yet developed to
police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Cor-
porate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SociETY 48 (E. Mason
ed. 1959). The significance of the procedure is weakened, however, by permitting a commit-
tee of ostensibly disinterested board members-the very persons who are to be policed-to
pass upon the merits of pending litigation. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate
Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. L. REv. 96, 110 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as Dent].
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 789.
8 Id. at 780-81. Since Zapata Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of
the state of Delaware, id. at 781, Delaware law is controlling concerning the question of
whether directors have the power to dismiss a pending derivative cause of action. Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-80 (1979). The derivative action instituted on behalf of the Zapata
Corporation by William Maldonado, a shareholder, alleged that the board of directors
wrongfully accelerated the exercise date of an employee stock option plan to the detriment
of the corporation. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Maldonado argued that in 1974 the director optionees
had knowledge that the company was planning to announce a tender offer for a large
amount of its own stock. Id. This announcement was to be made just prior to the original
exercise date under the option and it was expected to trigger a substantial rise in the value
of Zapata stock. Id. Had the exercise date fallen after the announcement of the tender offer,
the optionees, including the defendant-directors, would have been liable for additional capi-
tal gains taxes due to the increase in the value of their shares. Id. Maldonado contended
that while the acceleration avoided this additional taxation, thereby enuring to the defen-
dant-directors' benefit, it prevented the corporation from taking advantage of a tax deduc-
tion equivalent to the liability avoided by the defendants. Id. at 1255.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT
appointed.' In addition to their other responsibilities, these new
directors were designated sole members of a special litigation com-
mittee empowered to determine whether the corporation should
terminate any or all litigation, including Maldonado's action, pend-
ing against it.1o Following an inquiry, the committee concluded
that all such pending actions should be terminated." Acting upon
the committee's recommendation, the Zapata Corporation moved
for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary judgment.12 Denying
these motions, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, under
the business judgment rule, directors do not possess authority, to
dismiss derivative suits.1 3
On appeal,' 4 the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to adopt
this narrow interpretation of directoral authority.15 Writing for a
unanimous panel, 6 Judge Quillen observed that the policy advo-
cated by the trial court would give shareholders an "absolute"
right to pursue derivative actions." Reasoning that the control by
one person of the decision whether to litigate improperly negates
the rights of all other interested groups, the court held that a cor-
porate board of directors must be permitted to terminate detri-
mental litigation. 8 In addition, noting that a corporate board,
under Delaware law, may delegate its decisionmaking authority to





14 Shortly after the Court of Chancery rendered its decision, Maldonado filed an inter-
locutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 430 A.2d at 781. See generally DEL. CODE
ANN. Sup. CT. R. 42. Maldonado also had brought an action in the Southern District of New
York in which he alleged, inter alia, violations of the federal securities laws. Maldonado v.
Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Motions for summary judgment, or alterna-
tively, dismissal were filed in the New York action, however, and were granted by the court.
Id. at 277. The district court reasoned that the law of Delaware conferred upon litigation
committees the authority to terminate pending derivative actions. Id. at 279. The court's
determination was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, but that court ordered
the appeal stayed, pending a final resolution of the termination issue by the Delaware state
courts. 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981).
,5 430 A.2d at 786-87.
,6 Judges Duffy and Horsey joined in the unanimous decision.
17 430 A.2d at 782. The court found that any determination giving to shareholders an
"individual right" to pursue causes of action would be unacceptable. Id. Indeed, although
the Court of Chancery maintained that such a privilege was supported by Sohland v. Baker,
141 A. 277, 281-83 (Del. 1927), the Delaware Supreme Court explained that Sohland could
not be read to support such a broad proposition. 430 A.2d at 783.
Is Id. at 785.
19811
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directoral committees,' 9 Judge Quillen concluded that a special lit-
igation committee properly may move to terminate derivative
actions.20
Turning to the standard of judicial review to be used when
scrutinizing committee motions to terminate derivative actions, the
court stated that judicial review should not be limited to determin-
ing whether a special litigation committee properly exercised its
business judgment.2 Indeed, Judge Quillen observed that such a
conventional business judgment standard fails to consider, inter
alia, that committee members, "subconscious[ly]" loyal to the
board at large, might dismiss meritorious claims.22 The court,
therefore, appended to the conventional rule a measure of judicial
business judgment. 23 The Delaware Court held that, before a judi-
cial business judgment inquiry is warranted, the trial court must
first determine whether the special litigation committee acted in-
dependently of the board and properly exercised its business judg-
ment.2 4 Similarly, the court noted that the burden of proof with
respect to these matters is on the corporation.2 5 The Supreme
Court further held that even when the trial court is satisfied that
the committee acted properly it may nonetheless apply its own
19 Id. at 786; see note 3 supra.
20 Id. at 786-87.
21 Id. at 787.
22 Id.
2 Id. at 788-89.
24 Id. at 788.
25 Id. Placing the burden of proving a litigation committee's objectivity and reasonable-
ness on the defendant-directors represents a departure from the traditional business judg-
ment rule, for that doctrine had required the challenger of a corporate decision to demon-
strate that the determination was in some way wrongful. See Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App.
2d 247, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 493
(Del. 1966); Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 423, 42 N.Y.S.2d 768, 779-80 (1st Dep't
1943); Stegemoeller, supra note 1, at 339-40. Nonetheless, in an analogous situation involv-
ing an attack on the validity of a corporate transaction consummated by interested direc-
tors, Delaware already had placed the burden of proving fair dealing and good faith on the
directors. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (1952).
Some states have shifted to committee members the burden of showing that they con-
ducted a good faith inquiry into the advantages of bringing suit against defendant-directors.
See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 929 (1979). But see Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522,
531 (1948)(burden of proof on the plaintiff shareholder). For a general discussion of the
burden of proof on directors and other corporate officers and agents, see 3 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 921.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT
business judgment in determining whether the derivative action at
issue should be dismissed.2" Such a two-step approach, reasoned
the Supreme Court, would preserve shareholder actions which oth-
erwise would have been dismissed contrary to the "spirit" of the
conventional business judgment rule.27
It is submitted that the two-step judicial inquiry into special
litigation committee determinations adopted by the Zapata court,
while preserving the corporate right to terminate detrimental liti-
gation, is a commendable attempt to ensure that meritorious
shareholder derivative actions are litigated. Clearly, it would be
contrary to the fundamental theory underlying derivative actions
to prohibit special litigation committees from terminating detri-
mental suits altogether. Since the corporation is the true plaintiff
in interest in derivative actions, 8 the corporation, by way of a liti-
gation committee, should be permitted to terminate those proceed-
ings detrimental to its best interests.29 Moreover, the ability to ter-
minate derivative suits is one of the few mechanisms provided to a
26 430 A.2d at 789.
27 Id. Because the second phase of a Zapata investigation is left to the trial court's
discretion, it is conceivable that the corporation could sustain its burden of showing the
committee's reasonableness and good faith and still have its dismissal or summary judgment
motions denied. Id.; see notes 51-56 and accompanying text infra.
28 Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1261 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. Ch. 1974); Taormina v.
Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 475 (Del. Ch. 1951); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411,
414 (Del. Ch. 1924). A derivative action may be brought by a shareholder "[w]hen the corpo-
rate cause of action is for some reason not asserted by the corporation itself." H. HENN,
supra note 1, § 360 at 756. Because of the shareholder's ownership interest in the corporate
entity, he is permitted to step into the shoes of the corporation for the purpose of pursuing
the claim. See Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Johnson v. Ameri-
can Gen. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 802, 810 (D.D.C. 1969). The corporation, therefore, is the
actual plaintiff in interest, even though it is named as a nominal defendant in order to
obtain jurisdiction over it. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1261 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Nonetheless, although the corporate entity is
considered an indispensable party, it wields no control over the action. Brink v. DaLesio,
453 F. Supp. 272, 279 (D. Md. 1978); Slutzker v. Rieber, 28 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Ch. 1942); 13
W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5997. Of course, the prosecuting shareholder possesses no
greater rights with respect to the litigation than the corporation would have had if it had
elected to assert the cause of action, for the shareholder brings the action on the corpora-
tion's behalf. See Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5994.
29 The courts have recognized that it would be illogical to force a corporation to litigate
an action brought on its own behalf if it is determined that the costs and other adverse
effects of pursuing the claim far outweigh any potential benefit. See, e.g., Gaines v.
Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 772 (9th Cir. 1981); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979).
1981]
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corporation to dismiss unnecessary litigation brought on its be-
half." Absent such relief, corporations could be "locked in" to the
continuance of undesirable actions and plagued by meritless suits
instituted solely for their settlement value.3'
Of course, once corporations are imbued with the discretionary
authority to terminate derivative litigation, the potential for abuse
of discretion arises and must be checked.32 Traditionally, however,
judicial inquiry has been limited by the business judgment rule,
whereby courts refrain from questioning the conduct of corporate
decisionmakers. 3 Indeed, judicial scrutiny is restricted, under the
30 It is recognized that the demand requirement, see notes 40-42 and accompanying
text infra, also provides the corporation with an opportunity to determine that a derivative
suit is not in its best interests. A demand on the board of directors, however, is not always
required. See id. Moreover, at least one commentator has suggested that there are better
methods of eliminating frivolous litigation. See Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 632. One
approach would be mandatory judicial review of settled derivative actions. Id. Another ap-
proach would be to grant summary judgment motions to defendant corporations whenever it
becomes clear that derivative suits are not meritorious. Id. Furthermore, a number of juris-
dictions require the plaintiff shareholders, in a derivative action, to post security for the
reasonable expenses that may be incurred by the corporation in connection with the deriva-
tive suit. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (Deering 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-6(3)
(West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
3' Cf. W. CARY & M. EISENBEEG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 697 (5th ed.
1980) (prevention of detrimental litigation by requiring court approval of settlements). Were
litigation committees to be barred from terminating detrimental cases, corporations would
be required to litigate all such actions. Clearly, in some cases it would be more economical
to offer a private settlement to the complaining shareholder than to expend corporate re-
sources pursuing an action. See generally Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d
259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
32 Given that in no published case did a special litigation committee not terminate
pending litigation, it is conceivable that committee discretion might have been abused in
some instances. See Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 602; Dent, supra note 5, at 109. The
problem of potential abuse was recognized by the Zapata court which stated that "there is
sufficient risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case to justify
caution beyond adherence to the theory of business judgment." 430 A.2d at 787. In Pomer-
antz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951), the court noted that it is doubtful that a
disinterested quorum of directors would impartially decide whether or not to bring suit
against their colleagues. Id. at 344.
33 See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra. The permissible scope of inquiry under
the business judgment rule is clearly defined in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), the leading case in New York applying that standard
of review to special litigation committee determinations. In its opinion, the court explained
that "[tihe business judgment rule does not foreclose inquiry by the courts into the disinter-
ested independence of those members of the board chosen by it to make corporate decisions
on its behalf-here the members of the special litigation committee." Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d
at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. Similarly, the court observed that "while [a] court may also
properly inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's investigative
procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of such factors
trespass in the domain of business judgment." Id. at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d
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rule, to determining whether corporate managers acted either
fraudulently or in bad faith.3 4 Hence, critics of the business judg-
ment doctrine contend that the rule is inappropriate when scruti-
nizing the decisions of special litigation committees formed to
judge the merits of nondemand shareholder derivative claims.3 5 It
is here that "structural bias,"36 what the Zapata court termed
"subconscious" loyalty of committee members to the board at
large,37 lessens the likelihood of dispassionate committee action.38
Although several factors are responsible for "structural bias," per-
haps the most obvious is the shift in director propensities necessa-
rily occasioned by the shift from demand to nondemand litiga-
tion. Clearly, whether a shareholder first demands directors to
institute proposed claims against other directors," or whether the
shareholder is permitted to forego demand, some subset of the cor-
porate board will be called upon to investigate the merits of litiga-
at 929 (citations omitted).
3 See note 1 supra.
" See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1738 (1981); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 146
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The potential for abuse of special litigation
committees has led some to fear that the derivative cause of action will no longer deter
directoral misconduct. Dent, supra note 5, at 109. Undoubtedly, the temptation exists for
directors named as defendants in derivative actions to empower litigation committees to
investigate the merits of derivative claims, since such committees rarely conclude that deriv-
ative litigation should be pursued. Id.; see note 32 supra. Professor Dent contends that the
solution to this problem is to cut back the authority of directors to seek the dismissal of
litigation. Id. This, however, already has been determined to be unacceptable. See notes
28-31 and accompanying text supra. What would most effectively establish the desired bal-
ance between shareholders and corporations is a change in the procedure used to review
litigation committee determinations. See notes 45-50 and accompanying text infra. Such a
procedure must provide an adequate means of protecting the shareholder's right to recover
for injuries to the corporation, while not unduly shifting the corporate decisionmaking
power away from the board of directors.
2 Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 619-26. This Note provides an excellent discussion of
the potential for influence by implicated directors upon non-implicated committee mem-
bers. These influences, whether actual or subconscious, may tend to taint the committee's
determination not to pursue a potentially meritorious action. Id.
z1 430 A.2d at 787.
38 Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 619-26. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
39 See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
40 See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5963. "The very purpose of the 'demand' rule is
to . . . allow the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conductors of the
corporation's affairs." Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); Lasker v.
Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The demand requirement, therefore, allows
the majority of non-implicated directors to choose whether to pursue proposed litigation.
Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138, 141 (1st Cir. 1962).
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tion. In both instances, the investigating directors presumably are
disinterested in the outcome of the proposed or pending litiga-
tion.41 The ratio of disinterested investigating directors to inter-
ested non-investigating directors, however, is inverted. Thus, in
the case of demand actions, the disinterested investigating subset
is, by definition, a majority of the entire board, since demand oth-
erwise would be excused. 42 In the case of nondemand actions, how-
ever, the disinterested investigative subset, or special litigation
committee, consists of a minority of the entire board.43 Under such
" A demand on the directors is not required when the alleged wrongdoers represent a
majority of the board of directors or are otherwise interested in the outcome of the litiga-
tion. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5965; note 42 infra. Implicit in this statement is that
when demand is required the majority of directors necessarily are disinterested. Various
tests are used to determine whether a director is interested in pending litigation. The First
Circuit has determined that the approval of allegedly "wrongful corporate action" does not
brand a non-participating director "interested." Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160 (1st Cir.
1977)(quoting In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973)). Other jurisdictions have concluded that such support of the defen-
dant-directors and even dominance by those individuals in unrelated matters may establish
whether a director is interested. Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971); Papil-
sky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Lerman v. ITB Management Corp., 58 F.R.D. 153, 156-57
(D. Mass. 1973).
42 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 5963, 5965; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1831 (1972). See In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Barr v. Wackman, 43 App. Div. 2d 689,
689, 350 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975). A demand may not be excused simply because the directors will not
elect to bring suit, since one of the purposes of the demand requirement is to encourage
intra-corporate resolution of disputes. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 460-61
(1881); Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1197, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Because the princi-
ples of equity require that a corporation be given the opportunity to "vindicate its own
right," Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949), the shareholder
demand requirement only may be waived when such a demand would be completely futile.
See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5965; H. HENN, supra note 1, § 365; Note,
Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 746, 753 (1960). Shareholders have asserted that a demand is futile when the alleged
wrongdoers dominate the disinterested members of the board. In re Kauffmann Mut. Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). Such an accusation of
dominance may not be conclusory in form, but must be supported by specific facts. Cathe-
dral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 288 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955); Lucking v. Delano, 117
F.2d 159, 160 (6th Cir. 1941); Baffino v. Bradford, 57 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Minn. 1972). In
actuality, as noted by Professor Moore, "[tihere is no unanimity of opinion among the
courts, and probably the most straightforward approach is to admit frankly that it lies
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the necessity for a demand." 3B J.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE V 23.1.19, at 23.1-83 (2d ed. 1980).
13 The creation of a special litigation committee to evaluate the merits of a pending
claim denotes that either no demand was required, because a majority of the board was
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circumstances, the greater potential for "structural bias," whether
in the form of subconscious loyalty or direct majoritarian influence,
calls for a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the conventional
business judgment rule affords. 4
The Zapata two-step, by testing the reasonableness of litiga-
tion committee determinations, 45 properly augments such scrutiny.
Clearly, it is not unduly difficult for courts to test the reasonable-
ness of a corporate decision to terminate pending litigation. In-
deed, courts are required to make reasonableness determinations
in appreciably more abstruse contexts. In passing upon the validity
of corporate mergers, for example, courts are required to deter-
mine, inter alia, whether there is a reasonable probability that
such mergers might substantially lessen competition.4 6 Surely,
interested, or that the demand was made and the suit was not determined to be detrimental.
See note 42 supra.
4 Several jurisdictions have recognized a need to formulate a standard of review suffi-
cient to protect the rights both of shareholders and corporations. See, e.g., Rosengarten v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett,
64 App. Div. 98, 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (2d Dep't 1978), modified, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the business judgment shield did
not operate when illegality was alleged by the complaining shareholder. Id. at 319. None-
theless, as was demonstrated by the recent decision in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), courts have been able to distinguish the facts before them from Ashwan-
der, and uphold the applicability of the business judgment standard. In Gall, a stockholder
brought an action against corporate officials of Exxon alleging that millions of dollars had
been spent by an Italian subsidiary for the purpose of bribing government leaders. While
this allegation clearly involved illegal conduct, the court distinguished it from Ashwander
by setting forth the doctrine that the business judgment rule is applicable when the illegal
conduct is no longer in progress. 418 F. Supp. at 518-19; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed
Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Re-
sponse, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1227 (1977); see Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d
759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
5 430 A.2d at 789. In essence, "reasonableness" and "judicial business judgment" are
different names for the same standard of review. Under either standard the court must look
to a number of factors to determine whether the committee's decision was valid. Compare
Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 827-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1979)(reasonableness test) with Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del.
1981) (judicial business judgment). Both tests require the courts to engage in an in-depth
analysis of the reasons underlying the committee's decisions and the factors considered by
the committee in reaching its conclusion not to pursue litigation. 466 F. Supp. at 823; 430
A.2d at 788-89. These factors include the potential harm to the corporation's public image,
fiscal considerations, legal considerations and public policy considerations. 430 A.2d at 788-
89. If after engaging in this analysis the court determines that the committee's decision was
not reasonable under the circumstances, it will deny the corporation's motion to dismiss the
litigation. Id.
"' United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1974); see Com-
ment, Perceptible Competitive Impact-It's the Next Best Thing to Selling There: Jim
1981]
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therefore, a finding whether a special litigation committee acted
reasonably in moving to quash pending litigation is not an overly
burdensome task.
While the Zapata court should be praised for being so bold as
to append a reasonableness test to the traditional business judg-
ment doctrine, it is suggested that the court should also be com-
mended for its restraint: permitting the reasonableness inquiry to
stand as a second-tier, discretionary investigation.47 It is sug-
gested that the threat of a judicial reasonableness investigation im-
posed by the Zapata court will stimulate corporate efforts to cre-
ate truly independent litigation committees, thus minimizing the
likelihood of "structural bias." '48 Indeed, corporate decisionmakers
after Zapata presumably will realize that the resources necessary
to ensure committee independence are slight compared to those
consumed in waging lengthy reasonableness investigations. Thus, it
is submitted that a positive corporate reaction to the threatened
use of judicial business judgment will result, mooting the need for
such measures as mandatory judicial business judgment. Although
a more strict approach might guarantee the reasonableness of
litigation committee decisions, it is suggested that this benefit is
outweighed by several costs: the "chilling" effect upon corporate
decisionmaking; 9 the greater potential that judicial business judg-
ment inquiries will evolve into full trials on the merits;50 and, most
certainly, a retrenchment from the worthy objective of judicial
economy.
Notwithstanding that the discretionary use of judicial business
judgment is supported, it is submitted that the Zapata court erred
by failing to identify the criteria to ascertain when a reasonable-
ness inquiry is proper." Such guidelines, which relate to the inde-
Walter Corp. v. FTC, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 312, 313 n.3 (1981).
47 430 A.2d at 789.
41 See note 36 supra.
49 See Note, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 621.
50 To determine whether the expenses incurred in the pursuit of an action would be
outweighed by any eventual recovery, the court validly may consider the issues of liability,
causation and damages. See Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 767 n.11 (9th Cir. 1981)
(factors which were considered by the special litigation committee demonstrate that the
application of judicial business judgment can result in the examination of issues usually
explored at trial).
" See 430 A.2d at 789. One commentator has stated:
One would think that if there is no issue of fact on the issue raised in the first part
of the analysis, that the court would be required to proceed to the next step. If the
court has discretion to refuse to do so, and therefore to direct that the litigation
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pendence of the litigation committee, might include the ratio of
interested to disinterested directors, the organizational rank and
authority both of interested and disinterested directors, and the
length of service of such directors.2 Clearly, since courts ulti-
mately will have to determine whether to apply their judicial busi-
ness judgment, they probably will rely on several of the aforemen-
tioned factors, in addition to other unnamed considerations.53 It is
unlikely, however, that courts will be in accord as to the relative
importance of such factors.54 To the extent of such disaccord, con-
sistent judicial administration would be thwarted.15 Moreover, fair-
ness dictates that the court formulate guidelines so that corporate
boards, and their advising attorneys, can assess with confidence
whether their litigation committees are fashioned properly.5 6
continue, then what are the factors that must be used in exercising that
discretion?
Brodsky, Terminating Derivative Cases Under Business Judgment Rule, N.Y.L.J., May 20,
1981, at 2, col. 3.
11 See Note, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 2, at 637. Some additional fac-
tors which might be considered by the court in its review of the committee's decision are
directors' salaries and fringe benefits, personal friendships between implicated and nonim-
plicated directors, and gratitude for their appointment which nonimplicated directors might
feel towards their fellow directors. Id. One commentator has suggested that a mere "arith-
metical analysis" of the ratio of interested to disinterested directors will not adequately
reveal the presence of structural bias on the board. Cornell Note, supra note 1, at 608 n.43.
13 See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett,
64 App. Div. 2d 98, 106-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87-88 (2d Dep't 1978), modified, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). In all these cases the courts examined a number
of factors in deciding on the validity of a litigation committee's determination. Each court,
however, examined a different set of factors. It is conceivable, therefore, that given
equivalent factual situations, different courts applying their own unique criteria could reach
different conclusions as to the validity of a litigation committee's decision.
" See note 53 supra. Clearly, the absence of guidelines for determining when to apply
judicial business judgment results in unbridled judicial discretion. An English judge, Lord
Camden, once wrote:
[T]he discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is differ-
ent in different men; it is casual and depends upon constitution, temper and pas-
sion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and
passion to which human nature can be liable.
State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 278-79 (1865), rev'd on other grounds, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277
(1866); see Caminetti v. Edward Brown & Sons, 23 Cal. 2d 511, 144 P.2d 570, 576 (1944)
(Carter, J., dissenting). But see State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 308, 74 A.2d 565, 578
(1950) (quoting Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2539, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (1770),
who characterized judicial discretion as "sound discretion guided by law. .. [I]t must not
be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful; but legal and regular.").
55 Courts should strive to achieve consistent judicial administration. See United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
16 Cf. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, reprinted in [1977] 1 TRADE REG.
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In addition to its failure to provide guidance for the use of
judicial business judgment, it is submitted that the Zapata deci-
sion is to be faulted for implying, in dictum, that a reasonableness
inquiry is unnecessary when reviewing dismissal of shareholder de-
mand proposals.5 7 Surely, the potential for "structural bias,"
though perhaps less likely than in the nondemand situation, merits
a degree of judicial scrutiny greater than that provided by the con-
ventional business judgment rule. Indeed, it is not at all clear that
the potential for abuse of shareholder rights is any less likely when
demand is required than when demand is excused as futile.58
Though the discretionary exercise of judicial business judg-
ment in both demand and nondemand situations is advocated
herein, it is recognized that this would be a radical development,
one perhaps better attempted by state legislatures. Moreover, it is
suggested that legislatures should consider alternatives to the use
of judicial business judgment, for the approach does suffer several
potential drawbacks." One such alternative would combine courts,
arbitrators and screening panels. Under this plan, a judge would,
upon petition to the court, request both the shareholder responsi-
ble for proposed or pending litigation and the corporate litigation
committee which denied or wishes to terminate such litigation to
consent to arbitration."0 The arbitrator, a person or group of per-
REP. (CCH) % 4510 (similar guidelines setting forth the factors used to assess the indepen-
dence of litigation committees would be desirable). The merger guidelines of the Depart-
ment of Justice are intended, inter alia, to "acquaint the business community" with factors
used by the Department in assessing the validity of proposed mergers. Id.
"I See 430 A.2d at 784.
"8 When demand is required, the board could make a business decision that the action
would not benefit the corporation, and that determination would be protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. United Copper Secs. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-
64 (1917); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5969.
" See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
'o Arbitration is a resolution procedure in which parties agree to allow a disinterested
individual to decide a specific or future dispute. Because an individual is guaranteed the
right to trial, arbitration may not be demanded, but must be agreed upon. Drake Bakeries
Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Baking & Confectionary Workers' Int'l, 370 U.S. 254, 256 (1962). It has
been held that as long as a party makes an informed choice to submit to arbitration, the use
of that procedure may be enforced. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699,
713-14, 552 P.2d 1178, 1186-88, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 890-92 (1977) ("take it or leave it" con-
tract provision upheld). The decision rendered by the arbitrator or arbitration panel is final
and is for all purposes the same as a court determination. See United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Bassis, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice
Disputes-Some Problems, 676 INs. L.J. 260, 263 (1979). Moreover, the use of arbitration as
an alternative to judicial inquiry has gained widespread acceptance in certain types of cases.
For instance, a number of states have formally codified arbitration procedures in medical
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sons experienced in corporate decisionmaking,6 1 would evaluate the
litigation committee's recommendation and make a binding deter-
mination as to its accuracy. If one of the parties objected at the
outset to the use of arbitration, an examination of the litigation
committee's judgment would be referred to a screening panel . 2
Here, upon evaluating the conclusions of the litigation committee,
a panel would submit to a judge a report containing both proposed
rulings and a summation of the evidence upon which it relied. The
judge, in turn, would review the report and rule on the advisability
of dismissing proposed or pending litigation.
Although this adjudicatory paradigm may appear complicated
at first glance, it is possessed of several overriding advantages. For
instance, individuals qualified to exercise business judgment, and
not the judiciary, would play a large role in determining whether
pursuit of a shareholder derivative action would be in the best in-
terests of the corporation." In addition, inquiries by arbitrators,
screening panels, or judges would only address the reasonableness
of a litigation committee's desire to terminate litigation and would
not result in unnecessary hearings on the underlying merits of
shareholder claims. Finally, while the procedure would expedite
the settlement of meritorious claims and prevent the prosecution
of detrimental actions, 4 the judicial attention required would be
malpractice cases. See Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement:
Some Selected Perspectives, 24 ME. L. REV. 215, 231 (1972); Note, Medical Malpractice
Arbitration: Time for a Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454, 456 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration].
61 When individuals are selected to serve as arbitrators, it must be determined that
they are not affiliated with the corporation involved in the action. Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
2 Screening panels would draw their members from the corporate, legal, and lay
realms. Similarly, a number of jurisdictions already employ screening panels composed of
medical, legal and lay persons in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 6802-6814 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See Alex-
ander, State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diversity Actions, 21 Amiz.
L. REV. 959, 960 (1979); Lippman, supra note 60, at 228-31.
03 One of the advantages of arbitration and screening panels is the expertise of the
arbitrators or panelists. Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration, supra note 60, at 457; Note,
Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787,
794 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Classwide Arbitration]. The arbitrators' and panel-
ists' knowledge of the particular field of controversy lessens the need for expert testimony
which often characterizes judicial review. Id. at 794 n.42. Moreover, the use of expert arbi-
trators and panelists is likely to lead to a more qualified determination of the accuracy of
litigation committee decisions than judicial review could offer. See Desenberg, Medical Mal-
practice Arbitration: The New Michigan Statute, 31 ARB. J. 36, 44 (1976).
04 Cf. Alexander, supra note 62, at 960 (discussing similarly structured panels in medi-
19811
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
reduced substantially.
CONCLUSION
The Zapata court recognized that in order to protect share-
holder rights some methodology had to be developed for examining
the reasonableness of special litigation committee decisions. Al-
though the court's discretionary judicial reasonableness inquiry
may lead commentators to exclaim that the demise of the business
judgment rule is imminent, it is suggested that the Zapata test was
not intended to destroy the defensive shield of business judgment,
but merely to ensure that that shield would not be used offensively
by corporations seeking to dismiss meritorious shareholder claims.
Indeed, strong policy considerations speak against eliminating the
business judgment rule in toto, because many persons, if expected
to ensure the reasonableness of their decisions, would be reluctant
to sit on corporate boards.
Notwithstanding the merits of the Zapata decision, the fact
remains that Delaware courts may now subject litigation commit-
tee decisions to judicial reasonableness inquiries. Hence, an incen-
tive has been created for businesses to incorporate outside the
State of Delaware, where judicial review is limited by the business
judgment rule. Of course, the Delaware legislature, reacting to this
potentiality, might overturn the Zapata decision, thereby ensuring
the continued attractiveness of Delaware to corporations. A prefer-
able alternative, however, would be for Delaware's sister states to
take action similar to that taken by the Delaware Supreme Court,
since the benefits of the traditional business judgment rule, as ap-
plied to special litigation committee decisions, clearly are suspect.
Thomas P. O'Malley
cal malpractice litigation). In addition to reducing the necessity for judicial scrutiny, arbi-
tration and screening, panel proceedings typically are more private than judicial review. See
M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 24.07 (1968)(records of
arbitration proceedings should not be given to outside persons without the consent of all
parties); Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 182, 189 (1965); Note, Classwide Arbitration, supra note 63, at 794 n.41. Cf. Alexan-
der, supra note 62, at 966 (medical malpractice screening panels serve to limit publicity
concerning the claim). The confidentiality and publicity-limiting aspects of these proceed-
ings may tend to preserve the corporation's image as well as ensuring that sensitive informa-
tion does not become part of the public record. See Sarpy, supra, at 189.
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